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Abstract—This paper reports on the comparison of the 
subject and object of verbs in their usage between phishing 
emails and legitimate emails. The purpose of this research is to 
explore whether the syntactic structures and subjects and objects 
of verbs can be distinguishable features for phishing detection. 
To achieve the objective, we have conducted two series of 
experiments: the syntactic similarity for sentences, and the 
subject and object of verb comparison. The results of the 
experiments indicated that both features can be used for some 
verbs, but more work has to be done for others. 
Keywords—phishing detection; syntactic similarity; parse tree 
path. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper aims to report the comparison between phishing 
emails and legitimate emails in terms of syntactic similarity 
and subjects and objects of verb phrases for sentences. To 
accomplish our goal, two series of experiments were performed 
with three data sets consisting of two phishing corpora and a 
legitimate corpus. The phishing corpora is comprised of old 
phishing emails collected in 2005 [1] and up-to-date phishing 
emails reported in 2014 [2]. The two phishing corpora were 
used to observe whether the pattern in phishing emails have 
changed over time, with respect to subject and object of the 
verbs; and, if the difference exists, how significant it is. 
We compare a corpus of regular everyday emails [3] with 
phishing emails to emulate human experience in respect to 
what kind of emails they receive. We have conducted the 
experiments using the list of target verbs frequently appearing 
in phishing emails. The syntactic similarity analysis had a 
purpose of comparing paths from a target verb to the other 
nodes in syntax trees generated from phishing sentences and 
legitimate sentences. The subsequent experiment was to 
examine the difference in subjects and objects of target verbs 
between the two corpora. For the purpose of this paper, a 
subject is defined as the noun phrase which serves as the 
subject of a verb within a segment of a sentence, such as a 
clause. An object is referred as a noun or a pronoun which is 
the head of the syntactic object of the verb. For instance, in 
sentence We need you to confirm your identity in order to 
regain full privileges of your account. we define the subject of 
the verb ‘confirm’ as you and the object of the verb ‘confirm’ is 
identity. Our primary interest was to investigate whether those 
two features could work as distinguishable characteristics for 
phishing emails. 
In the previous research, we have analyzed phishing emails 
based on keyword matching [4]. This paper suggests an 
approach that goes beyond simple word comparison by 
considering elements of sentence structure as well as other 
constituents of the target verb in a sentence. In other words, the 
scope of the analysis unit has expanded from words to sentence 
segments. For our purposes, we hypothesized that a verb might 
bring up different elements in a sentence and also might lead to 
a disparate syntactic structure of a sentence depending on the 
intention of usage of the verb. For instance, phishers may want 
to use the word update in an attempt to gain personal 
information such as update your account, on the other hand, 
‘normal’ users probably choose update for other purposes in 
email as well, such as in I’ll update the document. The 
experimental results, however, indicated that such differences 
could not be generalized as the distinguishable features for all 
verbs in phishing and legitimate emails but were rather verb 
specific. The syntactic formation and syntactic components for 
a sentence have revealed the limitations on identifying 
phishing scams from unlabeled emails. One of the reasons may 
be the difference in a number of meanings (senses) that each 
verb may have, not detectable by syntactic analysis. 
The ultimate goal of our research is to extract robust 
features to be generalized in order to discriminate between 
phishing emails and legitimate emails. In an attempt to  
discover any specific patterns related to syntactic features of 
phishing attempts, we presented a  textual syntactic analysis  in 
this paper. The proposed approach solely depends on syntactic 
aspects of sentences. In the future research, we will investigate 
semantic characteristics of sentences for phishing detection. 
II. BACKGROUND 
      This section will briefly review the prior works on 
phishing detection techniques and pertinent information on 
syntactic similarity relative to the parse tree path. The previous 
studies for the parse tree path will be followed. 
A. Prior Phishing Detection Techniques 
With the increased attention to phishing, various 
approaches of phishing detection have been proposed. The 
approaches vary in their results, but all seem to be successful 
according to their metrics. The earlier methods were based on 
blacklisting [5], [6], [7], and [8], or link and URL analysis [9], 
[10], and [11]. Both mechanisms are still quite popular and 
widely-deployed in the industry. However, the applications on 
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the basis of those techniques revealed the limitations since the 
phishers continue to change the malicious websites and adopt 
an auto-generated system for URLs. In addition, one of the 
main drawbacks of those applications was to falsely flag 
legitimate sources as phishing. 
Later attempts to identify phishing concentrates on contents 
of emails. For example, Hajgude and Ragha [12] and Xiang et 
al. [13] proposed phishing detection approaches using 
characteristics extracted from the contents. In particular, 
Verma et al. [14], Lee et al. [15], Park & Taylor [16], Park [4] 
focused on identifying whether the emails contained phishing 
attempts by analyzing the natural language features in text of 
the emails. 
B. Parse Tree Path 
For general natural language text, Gildea and Jurafsky [17] 
first introduced the parse tree paths for their automatic 
semantic role labeling system. They used the FrameNet 
database, where semantic roles are defined as frames and the 
essential components of frames are called frame elements [18]. 
For example, the frame ‘judgment’ has ‘judge’, ‘evaluee’, 
‘reason’, and ‘role’ frame elements. The following sentence is 
the example stored in the FrameNet database: [Judge She ] 
blames [Evaluee the Government ] [Reason for failing to do enough 
to help ]. Since frame elements were annotated by humans, as a 
way of automatically annotating frame elements, the authors 
created the parse tree paths. The parse tree paths are the routes 
following the sentence’s syntax tree from the target word to 
other possible frame elements tagging up (↑) or down (↓) 
annotation. The figure 1 below is an example of the parse tree 
path. Gildea and Jurafsky calculated the probability 
distributions for generated parse tree paths in order to identify 
frame element boundaries. For instance, the path↑VB↑VP↓
NP had a high probability in their training data, and thereby the 
direct object of the target verb will play as a frame element. 
 
Fig. 1. The parse tree path from the frame element ‘He’ to the target word 
‘ate’ is represented as ↑VB↑VP↑S↓NP (see [17]) 
 
Swanson and Gordon [19] compared five alternatives for 
encoding parse tree paths. Their aim was to identify which of 
them could generate the most accurate parse tree path of a 
sentence in terms of the accuracy of their argument labeling 
corresponding to the sentence’s annotated semantic role 
information. The feature of parse tree path is heavily related to 
the syntactic structure produced by the parser, and therefore 
using different parsers creates different parse tree paths. In 
particular, the researchers compared traditional constituency 
parsers and dependency parsers. For the constituency parsers, 
they used the Charniak parser [20] and Stanford parser [21], 
and for the dependency parsers, three variations of Minipar 
parsers [22]. The results of their experiment indicated that the 
constituency parsers in overall performed better than the 
dependency parser. 
Gordon and Swanson [23] adopted the feature of parse tree 
paths in order to identify syntactically similar verbs for an 
automated semantic role labeling algorithm. Their premise was 
that verbs appearing in  syntactically similar sentences  would 
be very likely to have analogous relations with their arguments. 
In other words, they used the parse tree paths for measuring the 
syntactic similarity of pairs of verbs. For instance, their top 
pairs of verbs based on syntactic similarity include 
plunge:tumble, dip:fell, pluck:whisk, dive:jump.  
Some drawbacks of the algorithm were compensated for by 
Sagae and Gordon [24]. Containing part-of-speech tags in the 
encoding of the parse tree paths was one of the drawbacks 
since it brought about zero results from the cosine calculation 
between verbs of different classes. Sagae and Gordon removed 
the parts of speech tags of target verbs, and substituted the tags 
of end nodes with a generic terminal label. In addition, as a 
way of differentiating same paths having different end nodes 
based on the original parse tree path rules, the authors added 
four more tags (↖↗↘↙) for the direction of the transition. 
For instance, the path described in the figure 1 is represented as 
↗VP↖S↙NP by their feature representation. 
The research in this paper adapted the parse tree path 
feature to compare the syntactic similarity of verbs. In 
particular, the main focus of the comparison was to examine 
whether the target verbs had dissimilar syntactic structures 
between phishing and legitimate emails. We applied the 
Stanford parser to create parse tree paths, and tagged on all 
nodes in a path to closely investigate the difference in syntactic 
structures for the same verbs between phishing and legitimate 
emails. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
Two main experiments were conducted. The first 
experiment was designed to investigate the sentence’s syntactic 
similarity by the target verbs between phishing corpus and 
legitimate corpus. The subsequent experiment aimed to 
compare subjects and objects of the target verbs between those 
two different sets of sentences. 
For the experiments, two data sets were prepared: phishing 
and legitimate emails. The phishing email set consists of two 
different corpora, referred here as the Nazario corpus and the 
APWG corpus. The Nazario corpus was taken from a publicly 
available collection of phishing emails[1], with 4558 emails, 
and the APWG corpus was constructed from the emails 
provided by Anti-Phishing Working Group [2]. The APWG 
phishing corpus consist of emails that are reported by users to 
the group. In this experiment we used phishing emails reported 
in September 2014, containing 80384 emails. The legitimate 
emails are the sample emails from the public Enron email set 
by the CALO Project[3].  
The Nazario phishing corpus and the legitimate corpus  
were first used in the rule-based phishing email detection 
approach [4], where the original emails were preprocessed in 
order to extract text body. Since we have analyzed sentences in 
these experiments, the data sets were preprocessed, removing 
unnecessary information, such as headers, forwarded text, etc. 
Some of the preprocessed data sets contained duplicate emails 
and non-English emails in case of phishing corpus, which were 
removed. We followed the same process for the APWG corpus. 
After eliminating duplicates, the size of phishing corpus was 
2856 emails for Nazario and 25706 emails for APWG corpora,, 
and the size of legitimate corpus was 3828 emails. We follow 
the most frequent verb list reported in [4] for this experiment, 
resulting in the verbs: access, click, confirm, enter, follow, 
protect, update, use. The Figure 2 below describe the overall 
process to generate similarities. 
 
Fig. 2. The process of similarity analysis. 
A. Syntactic similarity 
The Stanford Part of Speech Tagger version 3.4.1 and 
Stanford Parser version 3.4.1 was used to create sentences’ 
syntactic trees. Once the sentences were represented as 
syntactic trees, the parse tree paths were found starting from 
the verb to the other nodes, and the frequency of parse tree 
paths was counted. As an example, table I demonstrates the top 
3 parse tree paths for the verb update from each dataset with 
the example sentences. 
TABLE I.  THE TOP 3 PARSE TREE PATHS OF THE VERB 'UPDATE' 
Rank Corpus 
The most frequent Parse Tree Path       & 
example 
1 
Phishing 
Nazario 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓PRP$  
[ update → your ] : To update your eBay 
records click here. 
Phishing  
APWG 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓NN  
[ update → account] : You need to update your 
account before the link expires , after 24 hours. 
Legitimate 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓NN 
[ update → business ] : These people should 
update their respective business units. 
2 
Phishing 
Nazario 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓NNS 
[ update → records ] : Please update your 
records on or before July 10, 2005. 
Phishing  
APWG 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓PRP$  
[ update → your ] : Please update your 
information within 72 hours. 
Legitimate 
↑VB↑VP↑VP↓TO 
 [ update → to ] : today can I grab you for a few 
minutes after the close to update you on fund 
stuff. 
3 
Phishing 
Nazario 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓NN  
 [ update → account ] : Please follow the link 
below to update your account information. 
Phishing 
APWG 
↑VB↑VP↑VP↓TO 
 [ update → to ] : You are required to update 
through the link below. 
Legitimate 
↑VB↑VP↓NP↓PRP$ 
 [ update → my ] : Can I update all my 
Netscape Bookmarks at the same time ? 
In order to measure the similarity for two parse tree path 
sets from phishing corpus and legitimate corpus, cosine 
similarity coefficient was used. For each verb, two vectors (a 
phishing vector and a legitimate vector) used for cosine 
similarity contained all the parse tree paths from both phishing 
corpus and legitimate corpus as the components. The 
occurrences of the parse tree paths in the phishing corpus and 
legitimate corpus were the values of components for phishing 
vector and legitimate vector respectively. For instance, if the 
parse tree path ↑VB↑VP↓NP↓PRP$ appears 1331times for 
the verb ‘update’ in the APWG phishing corpus, and 27 times 
in legitimate corpus, the value in the phishing vector is 1331for 
the path ↑VB↑VP↓NP↓PRP$, and the value in the 
legitimate vector is 27. The cosine similarity scores for the 
parse tree paths are listed in table II. 
TABLE II.  THE COSINE SIMILARITY FOR PARSE TREE PATHS              
 BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND CORRESPONDING PHISHING DATA 
Verb 
Cosine similarity 
Nazario APWG 
access 0.2923 0.2234 
click 0.5865 0.6944 
confirm 0.4388 0.5094 
enter 0.5279 0.5503 
follow 0.269 0.4184 
protect 0.4196 0.5936 
update 0.5547 0.6729 
use 0.5789 0.7028 
 
The first column presents the similarities between Nazario 
phishing data and legitimate data, and the second column 
presents the similarities between APWG phishing data and 
legitimate data. It was expected that a verb would construct a 
different syntactic tree based on its overall intent, but the 
results indicated that the syntactic structures were not 
drastically different between the phishing emails and legitimate 
emails.  As the table demonstrates, the range in similarity is 
greater in the APWG comparison relative to the Nazario one. 
All verbs but access had the higher similarity scores when the 
APWG corpus was used than Nazario corpus was used; 
however, the overall increase was not noticeable enough to 
consider since the maximum score is just above 70%. In 
addition, the similarity values vary depending on the verbs. For 
example, the verbs access and follow had much lower scores 
than the other verbs in the first column, and the score gap 
between access and use was almost 0.5 for the APWG 
comparison. This suggested that the difference in the parse tree 
paths was strongly affected by verbs themselves. To sum up, 
the syntactic structure of a sentence was not enough to be a 
distinguishable feature for phishing emails (for all verbs) 
because of the insufficient and inconsistent similarity scores. 
B. Subject and Object similarity 
The next experiment compared the subjects and the objects 
of target verbs between the sentences in the phishing and 
legitimate corpora. The underlying assumption of this 
experiment was that scammers and normal users might use the 
same verbs for different purposes. This experiment aimed to 
investigate whether the disparate purpose of verbs caused the 
difference in subjects and objects of the verbs, and if the 
difference existed, whether the difference could be generalized 
enough to distinguish between phishing emails and legitimate 
emails. The subject and object similarity measurements were 
also performed between the two phishing corpora in order to 
investigate how much they differ. 
When it comes to finding the subject and the object of a 
verb in a sentence segment, the Stanford typed dependencies 
representation (SD) [25] was adopted. SD represents the simple 
description of grammatical relations in a sentence as binary 
relations. The binary relations indicate the grammatical 
relations between the dominating constituent such as a verb 
and the dependent or dominated constituent such as a subject 
or an object of the verb. The Stanford Parser (version 3.4.1) 
provides SDs. 
1) Subject comparison 
Table III describes the most frequent subject of each target 
verb, its frequency, and an example sentence. 
TABLE III.  THE MOST FREQUENT SUBJECT OF TARGET VERBS 
Verb Corpus 
The most frequent subject (percentage)  
& example 
confirm 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (85.26%) 
We need you to confirm your identity in order to 
regain full privileges of your account. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (53.79%) 
You must confirm your Paypal account before we 
close it. 
Legitimate 
I (13.46%) 
I just want to confirm the trades I have in your 
book. 
update 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (75.58%) 
That requires you to update the order 
Information. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (71.84%) 
You are required to update through the link 
below. 
Legitimate 
you (43.60%) 
From there you will be able to update your email 
information securely. 
follow 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (44.68%) 
To do so we need you to follow the link below 
and proceed to confirm your information. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (46.15%) 
You are kindly advised to follow the instructions 
below to re-instate your accounts.. 
Legitimate 
I (12.78%) 
I will follow up with a phone call. 
access 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (79.85%) 
After your verification process is completed you 
will be able to access your account again. 
Phishing 
APWG 
they (55.28%) 
If someone else has access to your account, they 
have your password and might be trying to 
access your personal information or send junk 
email. 
Legitimate 
you (77.78%) 
You can easily access these real-time features 
through Yahoo! 
click 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (85.71%) 
You must click the link to complete the process. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (45.23%) 
If you can't click the above link , move this email 
to your inbox and then click! 
Legitimate 
you (60.98%) 
If you click on a link in this email and it doesn't 
open properly in your browser, try copying and 
pasting the link directly into your browser's 
address or location field. 
enter 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (86.19%) 
PayPal will never ask you to enter your password 
in an email. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (44.91%) 
You will be prompted to enter a new password. 
Legitimate 
you (29.82%) 
You will then be asked to enter your destination. 
protect 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (65.64%) 
To ensure your Visa card's security, it is 
important that you protect your Visa card online 
with a personal password. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (16.86%) 
You have been requested to verify your identity 
and protect your online account. 
Legitimate 
efforts
1
 (9.52%)
 
Robin Kapiloff, an analyst at Moody's Investors 
Service, said the city 's efforts to diversify its 
economy over the past decade will protect its 
revenue collections, even as some of the city 's 
biggest employers suffer. 
use 
Phishing 
Nazario 
you (56.98%)  
If you use popup killers please disable them. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (39.61%) 
You will not be able to use your HSBC account 
with us until it has been reactivated. 
Legitimate 
you (17.22%) 
You cannot use Netscape. 
                                                          
1 The word, while the most frequent one, appeared only twice with this verb. 
The rest of the subjects appeared only once. 
As can be seen from the table, the most frequent subjects 
between the two corpora were quite similar. However, the 
distribution of the subjects indicated that the most frequent 
subjects in phishing emails were more dominant than those in 
legitimate emails. The raw numbers may not do justice to 
similarity in subjects. For example, in some cases, such as in 
click, APWG phishing corpus contained more imperative 
sentences (click here) compared to the Nazario corpus. 
Although the subject of imperative sentences like that is 
implied you, the parser could not infer the subject. Considering 
the imperative sentences, the distribution of the subject you for 
click will be still dominant. This fits with the hypothesis that 
the verbs in phishing emails are used in very particular ways, 
while in legitimate emails they are used to articulate different 
needs, and for varied purposes. 
2) Object comparison 
This section compared the object of the target verbs. The 
most frequent object of a target verb with an example sentence 
is described in the table IV. 
TABLE IV.  THE MOST FREQUENT OBJECT OF TARGET VERBS 
Verb Corpus 
The most frequent object (percentage)   
& example 
confirm 
Phishing 
Nazario 
identity (31.35%) 
Please confirm your identity here. 
Phishing 
APWG 
information (25.08%) 
We need to confirm your account information.. 
Legitimate 
meeting (18%) 
Phillip, This message is to confirm our meeting 
with you on. 
update 
Phishing 
Nazario 
records (47.79%) 
Please update your records in maximum 24 
hours. 
Phishing 
APWG 
information (25.93%) 
Please update your information within 72 hours. 
Legitimate 
profile (17.24%) 
If you’re not signed in, you will need to do so 
before you can update your profile. 
follow 
Phishing 
Nazario 
link (61.48%) 
To confirm your identity please follow the link 
below. 
Phishing 
APWG 
us (21.94%) 
Follow us on Twitter. 
Legitimate 
instructions (7.14%) 
If you no longer wish to receive Autoweb.com's 
monthly newsletter, please follow the instructions 
below. 
access 
Phishing 
Nazario 
form (55.25%) 
Please click the hyperlink below to access the 
Regions InterAct Customer Form. 
Phishing 
APWG 
information (45.73%) 
If someone else has access to your account, they 
have your password and might be trying to 
access your personal information or send junk 
email. 
Legitimate 
Email/Calendar (19.51%) 
Does anyone have permission to access your 
Email/Calendar? 
click 
Phishing 
Nazario 
link (55.69%) 
To begin upgrading your account please click the 
link below. 
Phishing 
APWG 
link (40.78%) 
Please click the link below. 
Legitimate 
link (43.69%) 
Should you choose to not be contacted at this 
email address again, please click this link and 
enter the email address you wish to have 
removed. 
enter 
Phishing 
Nazario 
password (42.67%) 
PayPal will never ask you to enter your password 
in an email. 
Phishing 
APWG 
password (21.94%) 
On the next screen, enter a new password of your 
choice. 
Legitimate 
symbols (21.79%) 
Enter multiple symbols separated by a space. 
protect 
Phishing 
Nazario 
account (34.11%) 
Thanks for your patience as we work together to 
protect your account. 
Phishing 
APWG 
you (20.99%) 
Please understand that this is a security measure 
intended to help protect you and your account. 
Legitimate 
PC (13.79%) 
Robert tells you what's at stake and how to 
protect your PC. 
use 
Phishing 
Nazario 
account (16.31%) 
In accordance with NCUA User Agreement, you 
can use your online account in 24 hours after 
activation. 
Phishing 
APWG 
links (10.39%) 
Please use links below for details. 
Legitimate 
it (5.41%) 
I do not want to ask for interest free money if 
Enron will not use it. 
Unlike the subjects, the most frequent objects between the 
two corpora were all different except for the verb click. The 
percentage of the most objects were not as high compared to 
the subjects in phishing emails. It is still significantly higher 
than those in legitimate emails due to the fact that numerous 
sentences were analogous in phishing emails.  
We also measured the overall cosine similarity for the 
subjects and objects. For the cosine scores of the subjects, two 
vectors from phishing and legitimate emails for each verb were 
considered. The occurrences of subjects in each dataset were 
the values of the vectors. The cosine scores of the objects were 
calculated the same way. The results of cosine similarities are 
shown in table V. The overall result indicates that the subjects 
for most verbs are quite similar, but the objects are different 
between the two corpora.  
The results are consistent with the results obtained for the 
most frequent verbs. Interestingly, the verbs confirm and 
protect had a much lower score in subject similarity than the 
other verbs, and the verb click had a significantly greater score 
in object similarity than the other verbs for both phishing 
corpora. This shows that the similarity seemed to depend on 
verbs again. 
TABLE V.  THE COSINE SIMILARITY FOR SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS  
 BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND CORRESPONDING PHISHING DATA 
Verb 
Cosine similarity 
Subject Object 
Nazario APWG Nazario APWG 
access 0.9868 0.544 0.0733 0.0241 
click 0.9824 0.9652 0.9066 0.9003 
confirm 0.2433 0.3402 0.0153 0.0513 
enter 0.8712 0.883 0.227 0.2133 
follow 0.6489 0.6555 0.22 0.3162 
protect 0.001 0.0485 0.0724 0.1715 
update 0.8769 0.8953 0.2316 0.4152 
use 0.7364 0.8345 0.2372 0.4229 
 
The table VI reports the cosine similarities between the two 
phishing corpora. It should be reminded that while the email 
duplicates were removed, sentence duplicates from various 
emails were not. All verbs except access had similar subjects. 
The overall similarity scores of objects were relatively high 
compared to those in legitimate corpus. The low score for 
access was due to a dominance of several sentences in each 
corpus: Please select the hyperlink and visit the address listed 
to access the form. (179 out of total 324 sentences in Nazario) 
If someone else has access to your account, they have your 
password and might be trying to access your personal 
information or send junk email. (330 out of total 597 sentences 
in APWG) The sentence in APWG was also the reason that the 
subject score was relatively low compared to the other verbs’ 
scores. In case of use, the object score was low as well. Due to 
its nature of usage, the verb use appeared in many different 
sentences. The objects for use were the most sparsely 
distributed in those for the other verbs.  
TABLE VI.  THE COSINE SIMILARITY FOR SUBJECTS AND OBJECTS 
BETWEEN NAZARIO AND APWG 
Verb 
Cosine similarity 
Subject Object 
access 0.5458 0.2479 
click 0.9788 0.8945 
confirm 0.9808 0.8941 
enter 0.9649 0.8329 
follow 0.8911 0.6518 
protect 0.6941 0.7616 
update 0.9856 0.6138 
use 0.9222 0.3274 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented the comparison of sentence 
syntactic similarity and the difference in subjects and objects of 
target verbs between phishing emails and legitimate emails. 
For the syntactic similarity, we explored the parse tree paths 
for the verbs. The result showed that the parse tree paths were 
not 100% distinguishable between phishing emails and 
legitimate emails, but the difference was high enough. Looking 
at the result, most scores ranged between 40 to 70 percent that 
indicating that syntactic structure similarity depends on verbs 
themselves. This suggests that the syntactic structures of 
sentences driven by verbs are not enough to play a role in a 
definite differentiating between phishing and legitimate 
categories. Most of the verbs, however, have multiple 
meanings. We will explore the effect of meaning on the path 
structure as well as classification in our future work. 
The results of the subject comparison show that the most 
frequent subject of the verbs was the personal pronoun you in 
both phishing and legitimate emails. Intuitively, it is possibly 
predictable that the subject of the verbs in phishing emails can 
be you since the attackers’ primary purpose is to ask the 
recipient to perform some actions. The interesting result was 
that the most frequent subject of verbs in legitimate emails was 
you as well. One possible explanation for this is that the target 
verbs were selected based on the frequent verbs in phishing 
emails, and the chosen verbs have a common general usage, 
namely to require recipients to do something. Given that 
assumption, the scope of subjects for the target verbs might be 
limited. The cosine similarity showed that the overall subjects 
were quite analogous in general; however, not all verbs had an 
equally high score. Verbs such as confirm, protect had a 
considerably lower score. Unlike subjects, the objects of the 
verbs differed between phishing and legitimate emails. A 
possible explanation is that objects play a bigger role in 
delivering the sender’s intent, thus significantly limiting the 
domain. Looking at the result, most of the objects in phishing 
emails are information, account, and link; on the other hand, 
the objects in legitimate emails include PC, receipt, and 
meeting. They convey the main part of intention of senders 
respectively, but with the much larger domain in the legitimate 
communication.  
The results of cosine similarity between all subjects and all 
objects is consistent with this explanation. The verb click had 
almost identical objects regardless of the emails. This is easily 
explainable as a number of things that are clickable is limited 
in normal life as well – especially, those that would be given 
the direction to in an email. On the other hand, the verb access 
has many more possibilities that are of interest to a person 
phishing for information.  To sum up, the similarity scores of 
parse tree path and subject and object were not consistent, and 
their characteristics seemed to depend on verbs themselves 
rather than a clear-cut differentiation between phishing or 
legitimate categories. 
The cosine similarity for all subjects and all objects 
between the two phishing corpora was measured. The results 
indicated that most verbs had similar subjects and objects 
between the two data. In particular, contrary to the object 
comparison with legitimate emails, a majority of the same 
objects appeared in both phishing data. Some exceptions are 
explained in the previous section.  Based on the results, we 
could conclude that the patterns in phishing emails had not 
been substantially altered in terms of text contents. Given this 
evidence, it is likely that current and future phishing scams will 
still contain slightly modified texts in emails. This is a 
promising sign for our future research in that semantically 
analyzed subjects and objects can tighten the robustness of 
their features against changes in phishing emails over time.  
For instance, the most frequent objects for confirm and update 
were identity and records in Nazario phishing data, and they 
both changed to information in APWG phishing data. From the 
perspective of semantics, identity, records, and information 
can belong to the same domain.  
The experiment presented in this paper expanded the 
analysis unit from words to segments of sentences, and 
attempted to compare the verb-centered networked features in 
sentences compared to the previous works only dealing with 
simple word matching. The next step is to find patterns in 
email texts in terms of word meanings, and cluster them into 
semantic domains. We expect this work will be able to deal 
with the syntactically different, but semantically identical or 
similar words, and thereby produce features to be generalized. 
The ultimate objective of our research is to determine the 
hidden intention of email from the computer perspective so that 
machines could more accurately detect phishing emails. Since 
overall semantic processing is considered to be a heavy 
artillery, we attempted a lighter version as a stepping stone in 
the overall detection. Our future research will focus on 
semantically processing emails to detect phishing attacks based 
on the aims of emails rather than shallow distinguishable 
features. 
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